AWS

What it is

AWS, short for Amazon Web Services, is Amazon's business of renting
out computing by the hour and the gigabyte: virtual servers, file
storage, managed databases, private networks, queues and a long
catalogue of further services, all switched on through one API and
billed to one account. Amazon has sold it since 2006. Two of its
best-known services explain much of the rest. Amazon EC2 rents
virtual machines, which AWS calls instances, and Amazon S3 stores
files as objects inside containers called buckets.

In the vocabulary of the NIST definition, AWS is a public cloud:
anyone with a payment card can open an account, resources appear
within minutes, and every second or gigabyte of use is metered. It
is usually weighed against Microsoft's Azure and Google Cloud, which
sell much the same building blocks under other names. What AWS calls
an EC2 instance is an Azure virtual machine or a Compute Engine
instance on Google Cloud.

Every AWS resource lives somewhere specific. The service is divided
into Regions, each designed to be isolated from the others, and
every Region holds several Availability Zones. A zone is one or more
discrete data centres with redundant power, networking and
connectivity, physically separate from the other zones in its
Region. A resource is created in one Region, often in a single zone,
and a team chooses the place with latency, law and price in mind.

Access to all of it runs through AWS Identity and Access Management,
or IAM. An account starts with a root user that can do anything, and
IAM adds users, groups, roles and policies that say which API call
is allowed on which resource under which conditions. Most questions
about AWS security turn out to be questions about those policies.

Why it matters

Teams pick AWS for its range. A product that needs a managed
PostgreSQL, a queue, a content delivery network, object storage and
somewhere to run containers can have all of them under one bill and
one identity system, documented to a common pattern. The range is
also the price. Each service has its own pricing dimensions, its own
limits and its own corner of the IAM policy language, and a team
that adopts ten services now maintains ten small integrations with
Amazon's interfaces. Leaving later means replacing each one.

The second decision is what stays with the customer. AWS publishes a
shared responsibility model and draws the line in two phrases: AWS
is responsible for security “of” the cloud, meaning “the hardware,
software, networking, and facilities that run AWS Cloud services”,
and the customer for security “in” the cloud. Where the line falls
depends on the service. On an EC2 instance the customer patches the
guest operating system, looks after every program installed on it
and configures the security group, the firewall in front of the
instance. On S3 or DynamoDB, AWS runs the operating system and the
platform, and the customer is left with the data, its encryption
options and the permissions that decide who may read it.

The third is cost, which on AWS is a property of the design more
than an invoice that arrives later. Amazon's Well-Architected
Framework names six pillars to review a workload against:
operational excellence, security, reliability, performance
efficiency, cost optimization and sustainability. Cost earns its
place on that list because the same system can be built cheaply or
expensively by choices made in its first week: instance sizes, how
many zones, how much data leaves the Region, and which managed
services stand in for a process on a plain server.

What it looks like in practice

On the tech stack page, AWS sits beside Google Cloud as one of the
two clouds the company works in by default, with Azure added where a
client already runs there.

One engagement used both of those clouds at once: twenty Docker
applications ran across Google Cloud and AWS, some of them R-based
analytics apps. They were deployed and maintained with the same
configuration and monitoring in each cloud, so that no app turned
into a special case of its own. When something broke,
troubleshooting went through Podman and orchestration debugging
through Kubernetes, and the analytics apps were kept stable and
reproducible in production on both sides.

Another engagement ran the other way. For an international client,
an AWS setup had been over-provisioned and had collected unused
services, and the cost had grown out of proportion to the business's
needs. The work reviewed which services were used, removed
unnecessary services, adjusted the remaining capacity and moved
workloads away from AWS. Those infrastructure changes are the
delivered work described by the record. It does not establish a
like-for-like cost ratio, a productivity measurement or a
disruption-free migration. The example is useful for its method of
examining the existing setup and changing what the business needs to
run, not as a promise of a particular saving.

Both cases come down to the same habit. A pay-per-use service bills
for whatever was switched on, so an AWS estate stays healthy when
someone keeps checking what is running against what the business
uses.

Where it goes wrong

AWS rarely loses data or stays down for long. The expensive
incidents tend to start inside the customer's own account.

The root user does the day's work. Every account begins with a root
user, the email address and password that opened it, with
unrestricted access to every resource and setting, including closing
the account. Signing in as root for routine tasks means that one
leaked password reaches everything. AWS's guidance is to safeguard
the root credentials, put multi-factor authentication on them and
keep them for the handful of tasks that need them, while everyday
work happens through federated sign-in and roles.

Long-lived access keys leak. An access key pair works until someone
deletes it, and it travels well: into a laptop's dotfiles, a CI
variable, a container image, a commit. The IAM best-practice list
starts from the other end. People sign in through an identity
provider and receive temporary credentials, and workloads take
temporary credentials from an IAM role attached to the compute they
run on. Where a long-term key is truly required, rotate it, and
remove keys, users and roles that have gone unused.

A budget alert is taken for a brake. AWS Budgets sends a
notification when actual or forecasted spend crosses a threshold,
and its figures update up to three times a day, so an alert reports
money that is already spent. The resources keep running and keep
billing. Budgets can also take an action, such as applying an IAM
policy or a service control policy that prevents new resources from
being created, or acting on specific EC2 or RDS instances. It does
so only when that action was configured in advance, with a role to
act through.

Everything sits in one Availability Zone. A single instance with a
single disk in one zone is the cheapest layout, and it shares the
fate of that one location. Zones exist so that a power or network
fault in one leaves the others running, and the AWS documentation
recommends spreading an application across several. A database that
matters gets a standby in a second zone, and a web tier gets
instances in at least two, behind a load balancer that spans both.

A bucket opened for a demo stays open. New S3 buckets block public
access by default, but a bucket policy or an object permission can
change that in a minute, and a link shared with a client for one
afternoon is still public a year later. S3 Block Public Access, set
for the whole account or organisation, overrides those policies.
Turn it on wherever an account has no reason to publish files, and
serve public files from a bucket built for that purpose.

Further reading

  * AWS Documentation — the index of user guides, API references and
tutorials for every AWS service.

  * Shared responsibility — the Well-Architected security pillar's
account of which layers AWS secures and which the customer does.

  * The pillars of the framework — the six areas AWS asks a workload
to be reviewed against, cost and reliability among them.

  * AWS Regions and Availability Zones — how Regions and zones are
isolated, and why an application should span several zones.

  * Security best practices in IAM — federation, roles, multi-factor
authentication, the root user and least privilege, in one list.

  * Managing your costs with AWS Budgets — budgets on actual and
forecasted spend, their notifications and the actions they can run.

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