DHCP

What it is

DHCP, the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, is how a device that
has just joined a network finds out where it stands on that network.
A laptop that connects to a Wi-Fi network knows its own hardware
address and little else. DHCP gives it an IP address, the subnet
mask, the router to send traffic through and the DNS servers to ask,
without anybody typing them in. The protocol is defined in RFC 2131,
published in March 1997, whose abstract presents it as a way to hand
configuration information to the hosts of a TCP/IP network. It grew
out of the older Bootstrap Protocol, BOOTP, and its main addition
was the automatic allocation of addresses that can be reused.

RFC 2131 names three ways to hand out an address. In automatic
allocation the client gets a permanent address. In dynamic
allocation it gets one for a limited period, or until it gives the
address back. In manual allocation the network administrator chooses
the address and DHCP merely delivers it. Of the three, only dynamic
allocation lets an address go back to the pool on its own once its
holder no longer needs it, and it is the mechanism the rest of this
article is about.

The period for which an address is lent is called a lease. The
client can extend it, can hand the address back early, and can even
ask for an infinite lease; the RFC notes that a server may still
prefer long but finite leases, so that it eventually notices a
client that has been retired. Behind the server sits what the RFC
calls persistent storage: one entry per client, keyed by an
identifier, holding the parameters that client was given.

DHCP runs over UDP. Clients send to server port 67 and servers
answer on client port 68. The options a server can send, from the
subnet mask to the lease time, are specified separately, in RFC
2132. IPv6 has a protocol of its own, DHCPv6, now specified in RFC
9915, an Internet Standard from January 2026 that replaced RFC 8415.
It uses other ports, 546 for clients and 547 for servers and relay
agents, and it can run either in place of or alongside stateless
address autoconfiguration (SLAAC). RFC 9915 itself calls the IPv4
protocol DHCPv4 when it needs to tell the two apart, and it records
the IETF consensus that IPv4 configuration should travel over DHCPv4
rather than DHCPv6.

Why it matters

Every device on a network needs the same handful of settings, and
one wrong value is enough to cut it off: a mask that does not match
the subnet, a router address that belongs to someone else, a DNS
server that was switched off last year. Without DHCP each of those
values has to be typed into each device and kept right whenever
anything changes. With DHCP they live in one place, and changing the
DNS server for a whole office becomes a change to the server's
configuration rather than a walk round the building.

The lease is what makes the protocol scale. Because dynamic
allocation lends addresses for a fixed time, a pool can serve more
devices over a week than it has addresses, as long as they are not
all present at once. RFC 2131 says dynamic allocation is
particularly useful for clients that are connected only temporarily,
and for sharing a limited pool among clients that do not need
permanent addresses. And because a client may simply vanish, the
protocol does not rely on goodbyes: the RFC states that correct
operation does not depend on the client sending a release message.
An address comes back when its lease runs out, whether or not its
holder ever says so.

That makes the lease length a real design decision, not a default to
leave alone. A long lease keeps the addresses of departed devices
locked up for longer. A short one means more renewal traffic, and
less time to fix a server that has stopped answering, because a
client whose lease expires before it reaches a server must stop
using its address.

DHCP is also a question of trust. The first answer a device accepts
tells it which router carries all its traffic and which DNS server
translates every name it looks up, so whoever controls that answer
controls where the device goes. RFC

2131 is plain about this: its security section calls the protocol,
in its current form, "quite insecure", because it is built directly
on UDP and IP, and because the machines it was meant to serve are
hard to equip with passwords or keys. The same section notes that
unauthorised servers are easy to set up and can hand out wrong or
duplicate addresses, spoofed routers and spoofed name servers. The
protection has to come from the network around the protocol, not
from the protocol.

What it looks like in practice

Take a laptop with the hardware address 00-00-5E-00-53-2A joining an
office subnet, 192.0.2.0/24, where one machine at 192.0.2.1 is both
the router and the DHCP server. The laptop starts out without an
address, so its first message leaves with the source address 0.0.0.0
and is broadcast to everyone on the link. Four messages later it is
configured:

```text
laptop 00-00-5E-00-53-2A                        server 192.0.2.1

1  DHCPDISCOVER  0.0.0.0 -> 255.255.255.255, server port 67
                 is there a server here?
2  DHCPOFFER     offers 192.0.2.50 for 86400 s, server id 192.0.2.1
3  DHCPREQUEST   broadcast: server id 192.0.2.1, requested 192.0.2.50
4  DHCPACK       192.0.2.50 is the laptop's for 86400 s
```

Any number of servers may answer the discover, and the client may
wait to collect more than one offer. It then chooses one and
broadcasts a request that names the chosen server in the server
identifier option and asks for the address that server offered.
Every other server that sees the broadcast takes it as a refusal of
its own offer. The chosen server commits the binding to its storage
and confirms with an acknowledgement.

The acknowledgement carries the settings, each one a numbered option
defined in RFC 2132. For this laptop it could contain:

```text
option 53  message type       5 (DHCPACK)
option 54  server identifier  192.0.2.1
option 51  lease time         86400 (seconds, one day)
option 1   subnet mask        255.255.255.0
option 3   router             192.0.2.1
option 6   DNS servers        192.0.2.53
```

RFC 2132 requires the subnet mask to come before the router option
when both are present, and lets a server list several routers and
several name servers, in order of preference. The lease time and the
server identifier are not optional: RFC 2131 makes both mandatory in
an acknowledgement to a request.

Before using 192.0.2.50, the client should check that nobody else is
already using it, for example with ARP. If the address turns out to
be taken, the client must send DHCPDECLINE and start again.
Otherwise the timers start. Unless the server sends values of its
own, T1 is half the lease and T2 is seven eighths of it, so with a
lease of one day:

```text
t = 0 s        DHCPACK received, lease starts
t = 43200 s    T1: RENEWING, unicast DHCPREQUEST to 192.0.2.1
t = 75600 s    T2: REBINDING, broadcast DHCPREQUEST to any server
t = 86400 s    lease expires: stop using 192.0.2.50, start over
```

The RFC asks for some random variation around both timers, so that a
room full of laptops switched on together does not renew all at
once. If a request gets no answer, the client waits half of the
remaining time before it tries again, down to a minimum of 60
seconds. A healthy client renews at the halfway mark and never comes
near the end of its lease.

The server does not have to sit on the laptop's subnet. A router can
act as a relay agent: it picks up the broadcast and passes it to a
server elsewhere, and its own address, recorded in the message's
giaddr field, tells the server where to send the answer. RFC 2131
counts on this, noting that relay agents remove the need for a DHCP
server on every network segment. At the scale our networking and VPN
services page describes, which lists configuring and deploying 1,000
Wi-Fi routers and administering network infrastructure for more than
1,000 servers, typing addresses in by hand is not an option, and the
layout of pools, leases and relays becomes part of the network
design.

Where it goes wrong

A rogue server answers first. A home router plugged in the wrong way
round, a test machine bridged onto the office network or a
deliberate attacker can all answer a DHCPDISCOVER, and nothing in
the protocol tells a client which server is the real one. RFC 2131
lists what such a server can do: hand out wrong or duplicate
addresses, and point clients at a spoofed router or spoofed name
servers. Switches can filter for this, and RFC 7610 notes that the
IPv4 form of the filter, DHCP snooping, is widely deployed. Allow
DHCP server messages only on the switch ports that lead to your real
servers or relays, and drop them everywhere else.

The pool runs dry. A pool holds a fixed number of addresses, and
dynamic allocation only gets them back when leases end. On a guest
network where phones pass through by the hundred, a lease of a week
means that every visitor of the past week still holds an address.
RFC 2131 also warns that a malicious client can claim every address
for itself and leave none for anyone else. Size the pool for the
number of devices present within one lease period, and shorten the
lease wherever devices come and go.

A new subnet without a relay. The discover is a broadcast, and
broadcasts stop at the router. A new VLAN or office floor with no
relay agent configured gets no answer at all. A host that implements
RFC 3927 may then give itself a link-local address from 169.254/16,
which only works on that one link, because routers must not forward
packets to or from such addresses. Configure a relay agent on the
router of every subnet that has DHCP clients, and read a 169.254
address on a client as a sign that no server answered.

Two servers that disagree. Running two servers for resilience is
sensible, but RFC 2131 says all servers should return the same
parameters, apart from the address itself, so that a client behaves
the same whichever offer it takes, and it makes the administrator
responsible for keeping them consistent. Two servers whose ranges
overlap can also lend the same address to two clients. Give each
server its own range, keep the options identical, and compare the
two after every change.

Fixed addresses inside the pool. A printer given a static address by
hand, from inside the range that DHCP lends out, will sooner or
later collide with a lease. The protocol tries to catch this: a
server should probe an address it is about to reuse, for example
with an ICMP echo request, and a client that finds its new address
taken must decline it, after which the server marks the address as
unavailable and should tell the administrator. Those are safety
nets, not a design. Keep hand-configured addresses outside the pool,
or use manual allocation, so that the server itself holds the
reservation.

IPv6 left open. Filtering DHCPv4 does nothing for DHCPv6, which runs
on other ports and which a client may start when a router
advertisement says DHCPv6 is available. RFC 9915 points to RFC 7610,
DHCPv6-Shield, for mitigating rogue DHCPv6 servers, and RFC 7610
states that rogue router advertisements are outside its scope; they
are the job of Router Advertisement Guard. Filter DHCPv6 server
messages on access ports as you filter DHCPv4 ones, and run RA-Guard
alongside.

Further reading

  * RFC 2131: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol — the protocol
itself: allocation mechanisms, leases, the message exchange, the T1
and T2 timers and the security section.

  * RFC 2132: DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor Extensions — every
numbered option, from the subnet mask and the router list to the
lease time and the message type.

  * RFC 9915: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)
— the IPv6 protocol, its ports and messages, and how it works with
SLAAC; it obsoletes RFC 8415.

  * RFC 7610: DHCPv6-Shield: Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers
— filtering server messages on the switch, the IPv4 precedent of
DHCP snooping, and what it leaves to RA-Guard.

  * RFC 3927: Dynamic Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses —
the 169.254/16 addresses a host may give itself when no server
answers, and why routers never forward them.

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