{"canonical_url":"https://engineer.company/glossary/github/","content_markdown":"# GitHub\n\n## What it is\n\nGitHub is a hosted service, part of Microsoft, that keeps git repositories on\nits own servers and builds a place to work around them: a web view of the code\nand its history, pull requests for proposing and reviewing changes, issues for\ntracking work, and GitHub Actions for running jobs automatically whenever\nsomething happens in a repository.\n\nUnderneath sits plain git. A repository cloned from GitHub is an ordinary git\nrepository with its full history, and work moves between a laptop and GitHub\nwith the usual push and fetch. What GitHub adds lives on its side of the\nconnection: review discussions, issues, branch rules, automation settings and\nthe list of who may do what are kept in GitHub's own systems, not in the\nrepository you cloned.\n\nA pull request is GitHub's name for a proposal to merge the changes on one\nbranch into another. It shows the difference line by line, collects comments and\napprovals, and displays the result of every automated check that ran against the\nproposed code. A pull request opened as a draft is marked unfinished, and it\ncannot be merged until someone marks it ready for review.\n\nGitHub Actions is the automation built into the service. A workflow is a YAML\nfile in the repository's `.github/workflows` directory. It names the events that\nstart it, such as a push, a new pull request or a schedule, and lists jobs made\nof steps, each of which runs a shell command or an action, a packaged piece of\nautomation that can be shared between repositories. Jobs run on runners: virtual\nmachines GitHub starts fresh for each run on Ubuntu Linux, Windows or macOS, or\nmachines of your own registered as self-hosted runners.\n\nTwo more services watch what enters a repository. Dependabot reads a\n`dependabot.yml` file and opens pull requests that bring dependencies up to\ndate, and it separately raises pull requests for dependencies with known\nvulnerabilities. Push protection inspects incoming pushes for secrets such as\naccess tokens and blocks a push that contains one before it reaches the\nrepository.\n\n## Why it matters\n\nFor many teams GitHub is where the work happens, not only where it is stored.\nThe code, the discussion of each change, the record of who approved it and the\noutcome of every check sit side by side, so the question of why a line exists\ncan usually be answered from one page.\n\nThe automation matters as much as the hosting. With Actions next to the code, a\npull request can carry its own evidence: the tests ran and passed, the build\nworked, the scanners reported what they saw. Protected branches turn that\nevidence into a rule. A branch can be set to accept changes only through a pull\nrequest, only after a set number of approving reviews, and only once named\nstatus checks have passed, so the main line moves through reviewed and checked\nchanges and nothing else.\n\nBecause GitHub sits at the point where code enters a project, it is also where\nsupply-chain controls live: which third-party actions a workflow may run and at\nwhich exact version, how dependencies are kept current, whether a secret is\nstopped at the push. These controls are mostly switched on and tuned per\nrepository or per organisation. A large share of a GitHub project's real\nsecurity therefore lives in settings, which nobody sees in a code review.\n\nThat is the trade-off of a hosted service. You get a complete, maintained\nenvironment without running servers, and in return the rules that protect your\ncode are configured in someone else's interface, with defaults chosen for the\ngeneral case rather than for yours.\n\n## What it looks like in practice\n\nThree pages from the company's work show GitHub doing different jobs.\n\n[A delivery pipeline built on GitHub Actions](/portfolio/built-github-actions-ci-cd-pipelines/)\nsplits the work into separate workflows: one for the code-quality gate, one for\nthe tests and one per environment for deploys, with CodeQL, dependency review\nand a software bill of materials step running alongside them. The path runs from\na commit to a service running in Azure, and promotion moves a build through the\nenvironments along a defined route instead of by hand. The frontend ships on a\ndistroless image with no shell and no package manager, the Go API on a slim\nAlpine base.\n\n[A continuous security programme](/portfolio/ran-a-continuous-security-scanning-programme/)\nuses the controls that surround the code on GitHub. Every third-party GitHub\nAction is pinned to a commit hash rather than a tag, so nobody can move a tag\nand change what a workflow runs. Dependabot watches 6 ecosystems, Gitleaks scans\nthe history for credentials, and every build produces a software bill of\nmaterials with Anchore and Syft. The page names the real cost too: the volume of\nfindings. A scanner that reports everything trains people to ignore it, so\nkeeping the signal usable takes ongoing triage.\n\n[The deployment of a GIS software-as-a-service application](/portfolio/automated-gis-saas-deployment-with-github-actions/)\nmoved its test, build and deploy cycle into GitHub Actions workflows, so a\nrelease stopped depending on someone remembering the steps. The recurring data\nprocessing and reports moved into scheduled Python, Bash and SQL jobs, and the\nconfiguration and secrets were standardised so every environment behaved the\nsame way.\n\nPinning looks like this in a workflow. The long hexadecimal string is the full\ncommit identifier of the release that was reviewed, and the comment keeps the\nhuman-readable version beside it:\n\n```yaml\nsteps:\n    - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1\n```\n\n## Where it goes wrong\n\n- **An action pinned to a tag changes without warning.** A tag such as `v4` can\n  be moved or deleted by whoever controls the action's repository, so the code a\n  workflow runs tomorrow may differ from the code reviewed today. GitHub's own\n  guidance is to pin to a full commit SHA, which an attacker could only imitate\n  by producing “a SHA-1 collision for a valid Git object payload”.\n- **A workflow token holds more power than its job needs.** Every run receives a\n  `GITHUB_TOKEN`, and its permissions decide what a compromised step could\n  change. GitHub recommends making read access to repository contents the\n  default and granting write access only to the jobs that need it.\n- **Untrusted text runs as a command.** A workflow that writes a pull request\n  title straight into an inline script lets whoever typed that title choose part\n  of the script. Setting the value as an intermediate environment variable keeps\n  it data. The `pull_request_target` and `workflow_run` triggers start\n  privileged workflows, and GitHub warns that checking out an untrusted pull\n  request inside one exposes the repository to compromise.\n- **Administrators walk straight past the branch rules.** By default, a branch\n  protection rule exempts people with admin permissions on the repository from\n  its restrictions. Turning on “Do not allow bypassing the above settings” makes\n  the rules bind them too.\n- **A secret slips through push protection.** The form that is on by default\n  protects each user's own pushes to public repositories. The form that guards a\n  repository against every contributor needs GitHub Secret Protection and stays\n  off until someone enables it, and even then anyone with write access can\n  bypass a block by giving a reason, which raises an alert and lands in the\n  audit log. Once a credential is pushed, it lives in every clone, so rotate it\n  instead of trusting a history rewrite.\n\n## Further reading\n\n- [GitHub Docs](https://docs.github.com/) — the full documentation for\n  repositories, pull requests, Actions and the security features.\n- [Understanding GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/get-started/understand-github-actions)\n  — workflows, events, jobs, steps and runners, and how they fit together.\n- [Secure use reference](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use)\n  — pinning actions, token permissions and script injection, set out by GitHub\n  itself.\n- [About protected branches](https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-protected-branches/about-protected-branches)\n  — required reviews, required status checks and who may bypass them.\n- [Dependabot version updates](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/supply-chain-security/dependabot-version-updates)\n  — how a `dependabot.yml` file drives the update pull requests.\n- [Push protection](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/secret-security/push-protection)\n  — the two kinds of push protection, what each blocks, and how a bypass is\n  recorded.\n\n\u003chttps://engineer.company/glossary/github/\u003e\n","date_modified":"2026-10-20T21:59:50Z","description":"What GitHub adds on top of git, from pull requests to Actions and Dependabot, and the default settings that leave a repository more open than it looks.","formats":{"gemtext":"https://engineer.company/glossary/github/index.gmi","gopher":"https://engineer.company/glossary/github/gophermap","html":"https://engineer.company/glossary/github/","json":"https://engineer.company/glossary/github/index.json","markdown":"https://engineer.company/glossary/github/index.md","pdf":"https://engineer.company/glossary/github/index.pdf"},"kind":"page","language":"en","title":"What is GitHub?","url":"https://engineer.company/glossary/github/","version":1}