Zero trust

What it is

Zero trust is a security model in which nothing is trusted because
of where it sits on the network. NIST SP 800-207, the US federal
publication that set out the model in 2020, defines it as a paradigm
focused on protecting resources, on the premise that trust is never
granted implicitly and must be evaluated continually. Being inside
the office network, on the VPN or in the same data centre earns a
request nothing on its own. Every request for a resource is decided
on its merits: who is asking, from which device, for what, and under
what conditions. Written with a hyphen, zero-trust qualifies a noun,
as in a zero-trust design, and the plan that puts the model to work
is called a zero trust architecture, or ZTA.

NIST names the parties precisely. A subject is whoever or whatever
makes a request: a user, a service or a device. A resource is
anything worth protecting, and the publication counts printers and
compute capacity alongside data. Between the two stand three logical
components. The policy engine decides whether a request is granted
and logs the decision. The policy administrator carries it out,
opening or closing the path between subject and resource and issuing
the credentials or tokens for that one session. The policy
enforcement point sits in the path itself: it lets the session
through, watches it and ends it when told to.

The publication explains the shift with an airport. Passengers pass
one screening checkpoint, and beyond it travellers, crew and airport
staff mill about the terminal, all treated as trusted. That terminal
is what NIST calls an implicit trust zone: an area where everyone is
trusted to the level of the last checkpoint they passed. A flat
office network works the same way. Zero trust keeps the zone as
small as possible by moving the decision and its enforcement closer
to the resource.

Why it matters

The older model draws one line around the organisation and trusts
what is inside it. NIST's objection is plain: once attackers breach
the perimeter, lateral movement is unhindered, and unauthorised
lateral movement has been one of the biggest challenges for the
agencies the publication was written for. The line has also stopped
matching the work. Staff sign in from home and hotel networks,
personal devices are allowed onto some systems, and much of what
they use runs in someone else's cloud. NIST's assumptions follow
from that: the private network is no implicit trust zone, an
attacker may already be on it, and remote staff should treat the
local network they connect from as hostile.

What a team gains is containment. Under the third of NIST's seven
tenets, access is granted per session with the least privilege the
task needs, and authenticating to one resource grants nothing on
another. A stolen password or a compromised laptop then reaches what
that account and device are allowed to reach, at that moment and
through one enforcement point, rather than the whole internal
network. The decisions also leave a trail. The policy engine records
every grant and every denial, so the question of who could reach a
system, and why, is answered from records rather than from memory.

What it looks like in practice

Take a purchasing system, the kind of application NIST suggests for
a first migration because a defined group of staff uses it, unlike
email, which the whole organisation depends on. A buyer opens it
from a company laptop. The request reaches the enforcement point in
front of the application, which asks the policy engine. The engine's
trust algorithm weighs the inputs NIST lists: the request itself,
including the device's operating system version and patch level; the
subject database; the asset database; the resource's own
requirements, which may name an authentication assurance level or
refuse addresses abroad; and threat intelligence. An illustrative
decision record, with field names of our own rather than any
product's, might read:

```text
request   buyer-17 on laptop-0417 -> purchasing app, read and write
subject   procurement team; signed in with a phishing-resistant key
asset     enterprise-managed, OS patch level current, disk encrypted
resource  needs AAL2 or higher, a managed device, a domestic source IP
threat    source address absent from the threat feeds consulted
decision  grant read and write for this session; log as approved
```

The grant covers this one session and this one application. When the
same buyer, on the same laptop, opens the supplier contracts kept in
a document store, the engine makes a new access decision:
authentication to the first resource does not automatically grant
access to the second. Context counts too. One of NIST's examples is
an accountant who normally works office hours and suddenly asks for
the financial system in the middle of the night from a location the
engine does not recognise: a contextual trust algorithm can raise an
alert and require the subject to meet a stricter confidence level
first. Another is an HR employee who reads 20 to 30 personnel
records on a normal day and then asks for more than 100.

For cloud services, NIST points out that clients can go to the
service directly, with the organisation's enforcement points
checking policy on the way, rather than being brought into the
internal network over a VPN first. Every one of these decisions
depends on a clean picture of who should reach what, and NIST asks
for a survey of assets, subjects, data flows and workflows before
anything is built. That groundwork is the kind of consolidation
described in our case on access management across M365 and SSO:
identities and access brought together across M365, 1Password, Red
Hat SSO and OKTA SSO, least privilege enforced, and onboarding and
offboarding standardised so that access is granted and revoked
promptly.

Where it goes wrong

Buying it as a product. NIST states that zero trust is a set of
guiding principles rather than a single architecture, and that there
is no single set of tools or services for a zero trust enterprise. A
new remote-access gateway with the label on the box changes little
if every subject it admits still reaches the whole network behind
it. Fix: treat the move as, in NIST's words, "a journey rather than
a wholesale replacement", one business process at a time. Judge each
product against the tenets it is meant to satisfy, including whether
its data formats would let you leave it for another provider later.

Writing policy before the inventory. The policy engine can only
decide from what it knows about subjects, assets and processes.
Where that knowledge is incomplete, NIST warns, the usual result is
a business process that stops because the engine denies requests for
lack of information, and shadow IT, the systems set up outside the
IT department's management, makes it worse. Fix: survey and
catalogue the assets, subjects, data flows and workflows first,
shadow IT included, and only then write the criteria for a candidate
process.

Administrators keep blanket access. In many older designs,
developers and system administrators can reach every resource, and
NIST singles these accounts out for extra scrutiny. Moving everyone
else behind per-session decisions while the administrator accounts
keep their standing reach leaves the most valuable credentials as
the shortest way in. Fix: send privileged accounts through the same
engine, give them the access their current task needs, and use logs
and audits to learn their normal patterns so that departures from
them stand out.

The policy engine becomes the new perimeter. No resource talks to
another unless the engine and the administrator approve it. Anyone
with access to the engine's rules can make unapproved changes or
plain mistakes, and an attacker who disrupts the enforcement points
or the administrator can stall the business. Fix: log and audit
every configuration change, run the enforcement in a properly
secured cloud environment or replicate it in several locations, and
give the stored traffic data and policy the most restrictive access
of all, from dedicated administrator accounts only.

Enforcing everything on day one. Few policy sets are right on the
first pass, and NIST expects a tuning phase in which requests that
should succeed are denied. Switching straight to strict enforcement
turns every gap in the policy into staff locked out of work they
need. Fix: run the new workflow in reporting-only mode for a while.
Grant most requests, compare the logs with the intended policy, and
enforce only the basics, such as denying requests that fail MFA or
come from addresses known to be hostile. Tighten the policy once the
normal pattern is understood.

Treating MFA as the finish line. MFA lowers the risk from a stolen
password, but NIST points out that an attacker holding valid
credentials, or a malicious insider, can still reach whatever the
account is allowed to reach. Fix: keep each account's reach narrow,
and use a contextual trust algorithm that weighs time, location and
volume, so that valid credentials used in an unusual way still raise
an alert.

Further reading

  * NIST SP 800-207, Zero Trust Architecture — published in August
2020: the definition, the seven tenets, the logical components, the
threats and a road map for migrating.

  * NIST SP 1800-35, Implementing a Zero Trust Architecture — the
NIST practice guide published in June 2025, describing 19 example
implementations built with 24 collaborators.

  * NIST SP 800-207A — published in September 2023: access control
for cloud-native applications across several clouds, based on API
gateways, sidecar proxies and service identities rather than network
addresses.

  * NIST SP 800-63B-4 — the authentication assurance levels a
resource's requirements can name, of which AAL3 requires phishing
resistance.

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