Published a readable Tor onion mirror
Published the site as a Tor onion mirror on a readable address
beginning engineer, with the key generated off the host so it never
reached this repository or a laptop, and left it the one front door
of four that is never counted.
September 2026

Situation. The site already answered on three protocols from one
build. A reader who needed to reach it without revealing that they
had reached it was still making an exit‑node round trip to an
ordinary address, which is a weaker thing than a front door of its
own. The obvious objection to a fourth door is the firewall, and it
does not apply: the anonymity daemon reaches the network by making
outbound circuits, so nothing dials in, no port opens, and neither
firewall layer has anything to synchronise.

Task. The mirror had to serve the same pages as the ordinary
address, be published wherever the other mirrors are published,
carry an address a person can read aloud rather than a random
string, and never let the private key that is the address touch this
repository or a laptop.

Action. The role installs the daemon from the distribution's own
package, writes a configuration with the outbound proxy port
switched off, and declines to overwrite an identity it did not
generate — so a key placed by hand is simply used. A readable
address cannot be chosen, only found: the address is the public key
in base32, so a prefix is bought by generating keypairs until one of
them happens to encode the letters wanted, and each character costs
thirty‑two times the one before it. The prefix that was bought reads
as the company's own name. The address is a declared value in the
inventory and every converge asserts the host's real identity file
matches it, so a swapped key with a stale declaration fails the run
rather than going quiet. The key is caught by both secret guards,
after it was measured that the obvious pattern for a key file
matches a deploy key and misses this one. Retiring the random
address the mirror had shipped with was a staged cutover rather than
a switch, so the published address kept working while the readable
one was being published. The step that looked like the last one was
not: the key landed correctly and the converge reported no change,
because nothing yet named the new directory, so the new address was
never published at all — the role now fails on an identity on disk
that no service names.

Result. The site has four front doors onto one build, and this is
the only one that is never counted. Gemini requests and Gopher
connections are tallied per day with no address and no path; the
onion has no counter and no flag to add one, because this site
deliberately leaves that audience uncounted, and the blindness is
the price of the posture rather than a gap in the reporting. The
mirror also paid for itself as a second opinion: its first readers
were on a different browser engine, which does not implement the
scroll‑driven animation the footer relied on, so every one of them
got the colophon painted across the front page. That was a real
defect on the ordinary site, found by the audience that had no other
way to report it.

Categories:
1Web Development	/categories/web-development/	engineer.company	70
1Infrastructure	/categories/infrastructure/	engineer.company	70
1Linux & Servers	/categories/linux/	engineer.company	70
1Security	/categories/security/	engineer.company	70
1System Administration	/categories/system-administration/	engineer.company	70

Services:
1Website Development & CMS	/services/web-development/	engineer.company	70
1Infrastructure as Code	/services/infrastructure-as-code/	engineer.company	70
1System Administration	/services/system-administration/	engineer.company	70
1Security & Access Management	/services/security-access/	engineer.company	70

hThis page on the web	URL:https://engineer.company/portfolio/published-a-readable-tor-onion-mirror/	engineer.company	70
